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Abstract  
This article discusses Intellectual Property Rights and in particular 
global IPR expansion. That globally protected intellectual property (IP) is 
more valuable than ever must be set against the fact that today’s global 
network capitalism, in which IP is so valuable, also enables information to 
circulate beyond IP control. Similarly, global IP expansion and its resistance 
go hand in hand, as global IP expansionist policy contains but also 
encourages infringement. We document this conflict, the paradoxical space 
affording it, the boundary disputes that manifest it, and the global IP 
expansionist policy ‘ratchet’ designed, but which fails, to contain it. We then 
evaluate global IPRs and the case for extensions, as manifested in treaties 
such as ACTA, TPP and TTIP. This evaluation is undertaken though specific 
examinations of copyright, patent and trademark laws. Claims for the 
overall social benefit of global IP harmonisation and expansion policies are 
rejected. 
Global IP Harmonisation and Protection: A Paradoxical Ratchet  
A triple paradox created by global network capitalism drives global IP 
expansionist policy in the post-Cold War age. Globalisation, digital 
networks and capitalist markets all extend the potential profitability of IP-
rich, ‘immaterial’ content yet global and digital production and distribution 
networks also bypass IP regulation. Securing intangibles as ‘property’ 
enables monopoly prices, and hence encourages infringement. The very 
global networks and markets that global IP extensions can make more 
profitable for IP holders also facilitate the wider production and circulation 
of infringing copies. Such expansion of infringement is then said to warrant 
further extensions of IP regulation.  
Defenders of stronger global IPRs argue that whilst extending the 
monopoly rents offered to innovators, through longer, wider and deeper IPR 
protection will increase incentives to infringe; such rewards must be 
maintained to encourage innovation (May, 2007a). If extending IPRs raise 
prices and thereby increases incentives to infringe, the solution is stronger 
enforcement and tougher punishments (Patry, 2009). The argument for 
extension is then premised upon the assumption that IPRs are the most 
effective means of incentivising innovation and its distribution; and 
concludes that infringement should be treated as theft. Our approach is to 
evaluate the truth of this premise and conclusion.  
 We begin by firstly, outlining the three central paradoxes of global 
network capitalism, and then the boundary disputes that map IP expansion 
and its resistance. We then document today’s global IPR expansion ratchet. 
The second half of this paper addresses the primary types of intellectual 
property – copyrights, patents and trademarks and shows how global IPR 
harmonisation and expansion has not increased incentives nor global social 
welfare. In conclusion, we argue that the global IP harmonisation and 
extension ratchet is self-perpetuating, but self-limiting, in securing a narrow 
interest; and because it does not secure greater incentive, innovation, nor 
access to new/better products, extension is not justified.  
The Triple Paradox of Global Network Capitalism 
Firstly, globalisation expands markets and yet simultaneously makes 
them less controllable. Globalisation expands markets for IP-protected 
products, and hence offers increased profit opportunities. Outsourcing labour 
also reduces expense and increases competition between both workers and 
non-IP-protected manufacturers, who bid to actually produce IP-rich 
physical goods. Nonetheless, and paradoxically, outsourcing production and 
more distributed markets create flexible ‘global supply networks’ (Chon, 
2015) that are hard to control. Permissive borders (for freight), global 
transport infrastructure and containerized shipping also make it difficult to 
control the circulation of infringing products. Global markets in technical 
labour mean knowledge circulates. Indeed, ‘counterfeit’ trademark goods 
and patent-infringing ‘pirate’ medicines are very often made in the very 
same factories to which IP holders outsourced production. The situation 
regarding copyright protected intangibles is even more extreme. 
Secondly, global digital networks offer radically improved efficiency 
in production, distribution and marketing; but such efficiencies are only as 
useful to rights holders as they are to ‘end users’, who can now bypass 
paying rights holders. Digital networks have been promoted by, and promote 
the development of, transnational corporations (TNCs) as well as global 
finance, production and trade (Castells, 1996). Digital production, 
coordination and distribution reduce cost and allow global markets to be 
more easily serviced. Cost reduction is most extreme for copyrighted goods 
that are purely informational; the most extreme case of ‘outsourcing’ gets 
end-users to produce and store their own copies, whilst paying the IP holder 
for permission to do so. Digitalization created the perfect ‘profit storm’ in 
media industries in the last years of the 20th century. Yet, global digital 
outsourcing is totally beyond regulation. Free-sharing software has caused a 
crisis, first in music (David, 2010), but now across all copyrighted fields. 
Digitalization services TNCs, but also empowers the networked individual 
who can now bypass IP-holders. Where once IP law regulated inter-firm 
competition, it is increasingly used – mainly unsuccessfully – to regulate 
individual end-users (Johns 2009).  
Finally, contradiction exists between deregulation of labour markets 
and trade, and increased regulation of property rights (particularly IPRs). 
Global neoliberal capitalism (as distinct from ordoliberal competitive market 
maintenance: Crouch, 2011) combines intensified global regulation for 
property (especially IP), with increasing deregulation of raw material and 
labour markets. In fully deregulated global networks, intangibles would be 
free. Such non-rivalrous informational goods have no price unless scarcity is 
artificially maintained. Global neoliberal regimes maintain scarcity by 
regulating information as property; even whilst deregulating labour and raw 
materials to reduce price through competitive markets. As IP resides in 
informational products, its protection requires monopoly over subsequent 
reproduction. The suspension of market entry (competition) requires other 
producers and all customers be prohibited from making ‘unlicenced’ copies. 
Yet, suspending market competition to protect property creates monopoly 
rent levels that place a significant cost burden upon the wider society. This 
encourages both ‘pirate capitalism’ and a ‘counterfeit culture’ (Rojek, 2015).  
These paradoxes of global network capitalism destabilize attempts to 
assert full property rights in intangibles, even as such instability is what 
drives recourse to legal strategies to suspend ‘free’ markets, by means of IP 
monopolies. These paradoxes mean IP rich corporations need ever stronger 
regulations to reap profits from otherwise deregulated and ever expanded 
global sales and outsourcing opportunities, even as globalisation makes it 
impossible for any such regulatory regime to be fully enforced. IPRs balance 
the rights of owners and those of users. Expansion of IPRs over time, space, 
and in depth of coverage means more users pay more to rights holders for 
longer. Greater availability of counterfeit trademark goods, generic copies of 
patented products, and the ability to make free copies of formally copyright 
protected content shifts the balance the other way. This conflict is 
manifested in a range of disputes over where the boundary lies between what 
is protected and what is not. 
Binaries in Dispute 
IP expansion redraws the boundary between ownership and access to 
intangibles across all types of such rights. Many uses that would have once 
been acceptable are considered infringements today. Each IPR has, at its 
centre, a binary that is disputed in struggles over how far legal protection 
should extend. 
Firstly, the binary distinction between idea and expression limits 
copyright protection. It is not possible to protect an idea, only tangible 
expression. However, the line between idea and expression has shifted. 
Once, film adaptations were distinct expressions relative to the books on 
which they were based. Today, adaptations require copyright clearance. 
Extending ‘expression’ to cover ‘look and feel’ widens protection and limits 
creative use. A stronger distinction between idea and expression allows more 
‘creative’ play. Today’s IP defenders call this ‘theft’.  
Secondly, recent IPR expansionist policies have shifted the binary 
between discovery and invention. Patent protection used to cover only 
creations, not discoveries. However, the genetics revolution in the bio-
sciences has breached the discovery/invention distinction. Legal changes 
designed to commercialise this revolution, mean cell lines, tissue, genes, 
organs and bacteria/viruses, as well as whole organisms: if they can be 
abstracted from nature, can now be patented (Leong, 2015).  
A binary tension exists in trademark law as well, between private 
symbolic signature ‘marks’ and the public symbolic culture. When a symbol 
is commonly understood to represent a particular company or product, it is 
open to trademark protection. This domain has grown as TNCs assert 
trademarks worldwide, and as the domain of what can be designated 
trademark-able, relative to the common culture, has expanded. The rise of 
geographical indications (GIs) also extends the realm of symbolic possession 
deeper into what was once deemed the common culture.  
In recent years, IP coverage has expanded ‘upstream’, from particular 
expressions, inventions and symbols, to encompass what were once 
considered pure ideas, discoveries and the common culture. IP coverage has 
also extended ‘downstream’, from tangible expressions, inventions and 
symbols, to the objects containing them. Where once the book, seed or 
record was the purchaser’s, even if the information embedded in it was not, 
today rights holders assert control not only over the information contained, 
but also over the seed, the ‘eBook’ and the ‘iTune’ - even after sale. Thus, 
the purchaser cannot legally resell or recopy their purchase. Once, a library 
bought a journal and owned it. Now, electronic subscriptions mean back 
catalogues go if the library stops paying for the license (David, 1996).  
However, boundary shifting also works in reverse, through the actions 
of product users. Digital technologies and biotechnologies both blur the 
distinctions between abstraction, tangible form and concrete object. 
Formally IP-protected content is contained in every such object sold, but this 
IP content can be alienated from that object by users in the sense that users 
can replicate content themselves by making copies. From one CD, DVD, 
computer game or seed, unlimited numbers of others can potentially flow. 
Technical attempts to lock down such content, whether by means of digital 
rights management (May, 2007b), or ‘terminator genes’ in GM seeds (David 
and Halbert, 2015) have, in most cases, either failed or proven so 
controversial as to have required suspension. As such, rights holders still 
seek legal protection over what they have failed to physically lock down. As 
boundaries shift in one direction regarding what can be done legally by 
users, whilst shifting in the opposite direction in terms of what users can 
substantively (if not lawfully) do, boundary shifting becomes boundary 
blurring.  
Global IPR expansion has been sought as a means of regulating the 
paradoxical character of globalisation, digital networks and capitalism itself, 
by re-calibrating the boundaries between idea and expression, discovery and 
invention, and between cultural signs and signature brands/marks, in each 
case by expanding what can be owned. This containment, re-calibration and 
expansion agenda has been driven by and serves IPR holders, not the 
common good (Held, 2010). Policing everyone, everywhere, all the time, 
requires power, but the need to do so also manifests extreme vulnerability. 
This combination of power and vulnerability drives the global IP 
expansionist ratchet. 
Expanding IP  
Central to the international protection of IP is the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO manages the Paris (patent) (1883) 
and Berne (copyright) (1886) treaties. However, the number of signatories to 
these first international IP treaties remained limited until the 20
th
 century 
(see May, 2007a). The US decision, in 1988, to join Berne marked the start 
of today’s global IP expansion and harmonisation ratchet. The US initially 
rejected foreign IP claims in the promotion of its own industrial and social 
development and was later relatively accepting of foreign infringements of 
its own IP in enabling the development of its cold war allies (May and Sell, 
2005). However, rising trade deficits with these ‘allies’, who had capitalised 
on US funded innovations (Archibugi and Filippetti, 2010; and Henry and 
Stiglitz, 2010), saw the US, and its IP rich TNCs (Sell, 2003), negotiate the 
replacement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTOs first action, in 1994, was 
TRIPS, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement 
(Ryan, 1998). TRIPS required all WTO signatories to adopt a US led IP 
expansion and harmonisation programme. Linking IP harmonisation to 
global trade rules allowed non-compliance to be punished with trade 
sanctions.  
GATT managed post-1945 global economic growth, eventually 
enabling Pacific Rim and Western European countries to challenge US 
industrial dominance. WTO/TRIPS offset this challenge by globally 
enforcing US advantage in IP, creating the conditions for a global network 
capitalism conducive to IP rich TNCs. However, global outsourcing, supply 
networks and digital distribution expanded access to intangibles beyond IP 
rights holder’s control. Paradoxically, WTO/TRIPS’ success generated 
expansion of what it was supposed to prevent, leading rights holders to calls 
for further global IP extension, even whilst developing countries were 
becoming more critical inside WTO’s (and WIPO’s) multilateral fora.  
Together, WIPO and WTO form the foundation for global IP today. 
However, both agencies are the focus of conflict between developed 
countries and the global south (Halbert, 2007). WTO and WIPO operate by 
multilateral negotiations between all member/signatory states. IP rich TNCs 
and developed states, in particular the US, were initially successful in using 
multilateral platforms to drive through significant IP extension and 
harmonisation agreements, such as TRIPS. However, TRIPS has 
subsequently gone through multiple phases of negotiation, resistance, and 
calibration, as developing societies became aware of what strong IP 
enforcement will cost them (Halbert 2005, Gervais, 2015, pp. 101-102). 
Similarly, WIPO has been pressed into adopting a development agenda that 
promotes affordable access, not simply extending IP (May, 2007a).  
As such, other avenues are being pursued to expand IP protection well 
beyond TRIPS. The US has entered into 41 bilateral treaties since signing 
TRIPS to ensure better IP protection abroad (Moberg, 2014, pp. 232–233). 
There have also been numerous tailored plurilateral agreements.  
The failed Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA) sought to 
bypass the multilateralism of WIPO and TRIPS, in favour of more 
controlled negotiating environments (Yu, 2015). Plurilateral, ‘country club’, 
treaties, like ACTA, negotiated between the United States and 
geographically specific sets of partners (Gervais, 2015, p. 107), continue to 
take forward the global-IP-harmonisation agenda initially pursued through 
WIPO/TRIPS – if only by smaller steps. Such plurilateral agreements, 
negotiated in secret between governments and IP lobbyists, can be more 
tightly managed than could the relatively public multilateral negotiations of 
WIPO and WTO. However, when ACTA was finally proposed by the 
acceding states to their citizens, it was met with massive global protest - 
sufficient to halt passage. Just as ACTA sought to bypass the 
accommodations to developing nations achieved within multilateral settings 
like WTO and WIPO, so it was that worldwide resistance to ACTA, has 
produced a shift to even smaller sets of negotiating partners, which when 
added together encircle the globe. The Transpacific Partnership (TPP), 
negotiated between the United States and nine other pacific region countries, 
has continued forward with the ACTA agenda. The negotiations for TPP 
were also secret to all but the corporate ‘cleared advisors’ who helped draft 
the text (Levine, 2012, p. 128). Within the framework of TPP, human rights 
are subordinated to IPRs, and TRIPS’ flexibilities for developing countries 
have been stripped (Patel, 2015, p. 507). In parallel to TPP, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently being negotiated 
between the US and Europe, similarly includes more expansive IP 
protection, and a diminishing of checks and limits on IPRs relative to other 
rights and democratic principles. These agreements and parallel ‘TRIPS 
plus’ agreements signed between the US and other countries all prioritize IP 
extension over other rights (Moberg, 2014, p. 232). 
 Taken together, TPP and TTIP cover the bulk of the global economy 
(by GDP) pressing towards enhanced IP rights at the global level, by 
marginalising countries that embrace the flexibilities built into TRIPS. 
TRIPS created conditions conducive to the global expansion of an IP based 
business model, which itself, in promoting the growth of today’s global 
network capitalism and world spanning IP monopoly rents, also afforded and 
incentivised higher levels of infringement. This has led to calls for even 
further regulation in what we call the global IP extension ratchet. If global IP 
harmonisation and extension best incentivised innovation and its 
distribution, such policies might be justified. Through an examination of 
copyright, patent and trademark respectively, we show that this is not the 
case.  
Copyright 
The 1709 Statute of Anne was the first copyright statute, offering up 
to 28 years protection on literary works in the United Kingdom (Ochoa and 
Rose, 2002). Today, under TRIPS all forms of expressive work from books, 
music, paintings, films and software, to statues and buildings, are copyright 
protected globally for the life of the author, plus fifty or even seventy years. 
From Berne to TRIPS, international treaties have prohibited a requirement to 
register copyright. Law is therefore retroactive in claims-making, producing 
uncertainty and hence increasing the risks associated with any subsequent 
creation; this is especially true when time, depth and geographical extension 
radically increase the parameters of what constitutes infringement. 
Uncertainty, and punitive damages where infringement is found, 
compounded by increased coverage over time, space and depth, intensify the 
scope for ‘litigation through the margins’ (Phythian-Adams, 2015, p. 37) - 
where powerful rights-holding corporations press infringement claims, even 
through multiple appeals, such that smaller actors are forced to concede as 
they cannot afford their own protracted defence. This inhibits creative 
expression and its distribution. 
If the strong defence of established commercial actors actually best 
promoted creative work, as IP rich TNCs claim, this might justify such 
protection, and even its extension. However, it does not. Royalties-based 
contracts between authors/composers etc. and corporations sign over 
copyright in exchange for returns of between five and fifteen percent on net 
sales. However, as most of the cost associated with producing the work 
(producers, lawyers, managers, marketers, sound engineers, indexers, video 
makers, and so on) are set against these royalties, creative workers usually 
end up owing money to their record companies/publishers rather than getting 
paid; in this event, they would have been better off if they had been paid for 
their time as conventional employees (David, 2010). With most costs offset 
against royalties, the remaining eighty-five to ninety-five percent of net sales 
goes to the label/publisher, not the creative artist; thus, whilst most artists 
fail to ‘recoup’ (repaying the investment made in producing their work from 
royalties), their record company or publisher can still profit from their 
creations.  
Dave O’Brien (2015) highlights how global copyright harmonisation/ 
extension for the ‘creative industries’ has in recent years facilitated 
deregulation of working conditions for ‘creative workers’. The royalties-
based creative sectors, and the wider, IP-regulated, service-, design- and 
brand-based economy, sees many working for nothing, indebted to those 
they sign rights over to, and/or in insecure non-formal employment. In 
contrast, copyright-infringing file-sharing reduces revenues to copyright-
holding corporations. In doing so, file-sharing also reduces opportunity 
costs, relative to live performance. As such, concerts, festivals, plays, talks 
and other live events have seen ticket prices and volumes increase, 
benefiting performers (Krueger, 2004). 
Attempting to regulate copyright in an age of global network 
distribution has required pervasive surveillance, and a shift in legal attention 
from commercial piracy to individual copying. The need to police everyone, 
everywhere requires expanded powers, reflecting the vulnerability of 
hierarchical, scarcity-based, systems in an age of horizontal, non-rivalrous 
distribution. Parallel digital revolutions based on selling and on sharing, 
respectively, face off against one another - from the CD to file-sharing, and 
from satellite ‘pay to view’ television to live-streaming (David, Kirton and 
Millward, 2015). There has been a legal and technical cat-and-mouse game 
of enclosure and evasion. Every attempt to clamp down has provoked a new 
level of distributed evading. With each round of regulative failure, calls for 
more draconian measures rise. New methods of defending the indefensible 
create added infringements of non-IP rights (Brown, 2015). Privacy, free 
speech and access to the common culture are diminished. This does not 
benefit creative producers nor audiences; who benefit most from free-
publicity and direct exchange through live events. 
Attempts to enforce copyright on everyone, everywhere, for longer, 
also constrain future creative freedom. Extension of copyright in time, space 
and depth of coverage has led to disincentives to create, through intensified 
protection of past works. The dead cannot be incentivized, even if their back 
catalogues profit corporations. Whilst William Wordsworth campaigned for 
a seven-year continuation of copyright after death (to protect his extended 
family), his most creative work was carried out in renunciation of individual 
authorship and hence copyright (David, 2006).  
Life plus seventy years, and non-registration, leaves archives full of 
orphan works (Op den Kamp, 2015) - archived music, film and television 
programmes, for instance - whose formal ‘ownership’ is unclear even up to 
one hundred years after production. Fear of punitive damages means much 
archival material remains buried. While some content is freed via illicit 
digital sharing networks, the act of digitizing constitutes infringement so 
large amounts of work remain incarcerated. Prosecution of fans for ‘fan 
fiction’ again highlights a fetish for control that may harm reception and 
development of work which benefits from audience interaction (Liebler, 
2015). 
It might be imagined that computer games, being most vulnerable to 
infringement, and, having no ‘live’ alternative that might benefit from 
freely-shared publicity, would suffer most. The reverse is true. Whilst books, 
music, film and other older media have struggled to come to terms with 
digital distribution, computer games’ revenues have overtaken all other 
media sectors. Computer game makers, whilst vocal in their disquiet about 
infringement, have grown precisely because they release new versions of 
games and new formats (the console and the online multiplayer 
environment) that render back catalogues worthless. Games companies 
outpace pirates. They do not rely on protectionism to uphold the value of 
past work. That every attempt to introduce encryption in the distribution of 
digital content has been hacked almost as soon as it has been released 
(David, 2010) gives some indication of the ‘creative’ capacity of online 
sharing-based programming, relative to the bunkered R&D departments of 
old-media corporations. The development of the fundamental operating 
systems on which modern computers operate, i.e., the Internet, its protocols, 
as well as the World Wide Web, as products of non-proprietary 
collaborations rather than of copyright-regulated ownership again illustrates 
the strength of the creative commons compared to the thicketed terrain of 
copyrighted content (Lee, 2015). That Facebook still uses the central-server-
based architecture Napster used in 1999, whilst file-sharing has moved 
through ever more sophisticated modes of distributed computing, again 
challenges the myth that copyright protection best incentivizes creativity.  
Extending copyright does not best promote creativity or creation, and 
can make things worse. Protectionism fails to reward creative workers, and 
has facilitated deregulation of labour markets in the creative industries. 
Copyright law creates uncertainty, additional risks and costs; all exacerbated 
by extension. Alternatively, infringement radically reduces opportunity costs 
as well as increasing publicity and revenues for live performance – hence 
benefiting those currently performing, rather than those rights holders 
(typically not the artists) controlling back catalogues. Games companies’ 
creation of new products, rather than stretching out the commercial value of 
old stock, has - alongside the efforts of hackers, Internet protocol engineers 
and the creators of the Web - shown that creativity is best incentivized and 
achieved without recourse to copyright protection, let alone its extension. 
The claims made by IP lobbyists, that the extension of IP protection such as 
would be afforded by TTIP and TPP is warranted, are false. Such extension 
would be harmful for creative workers, creativity and for the wider society.  
Patents  
Patentable subject matter has expanded beyond what was once 
understood as an original invention. Focused on inventions, patents began in 
15th century Europe (Duffy, 2002, pp. 711–712), took off in the 19th century 
with the Paris Treaty (1883), and became central to trade in TRIPS today. 
TRIPS has globalised patent protection, requiring all member countries to 
provide minimum protections to all other member countries in terms of time 
(20 years), scope (products and process) for any patent meeting the criteria 
of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability.  
The expansion and harmonisation of patents at the global level make 
the controversies around the depth, geographical reach and to a lesser extent 
duration of patents more salient. It raises questions regarding how patents 
are used, specifically when owning patents to secure monopoly rents has 
become more prominent. Firstly, patent thickets (when a company files 
multiple patents in an area of innovation in order to keep others from 
inventing in the field) inhibit innovation and intensify with global patent 
harmonisation and extension. By limiting scope for new innovators to enter 
the field, thickets are antithetical to ‘free markets’ where competition is 
supposed to improve quality. Often, because patents can be purchased when 
companies are sold, thickets are associated with the existence of ‘patent 
trolls’. Patent trolls either file broad patents that can be used against 
numerous other inventors or purchase patents during a business transaction, 
and then makes money from enforcing something they acquired, not 
something they invented. Such people have a legal interest in defending the 
patents for money and see them only as a valuable commodity, not as 
something that might help produce what the U.S. Constitution requires -- 
‘progress in the arts and sciences.’  In both cases, property-based ownership 
in a field dependent upon sharing ideas to create new things limits 
innovation and access. By dis-incentivizing cooperation and communication, 
the patent system itself works against innovation, not for it. Extending 
patent, whether in geographical scope, duration or in depth and range of 
potential coverage would only further intensify these problems.  
Patent extension can also harm the public good by patenting life itself. 
Most scholars chart the beginning of the biotechnology revolution to the 
landmark United States Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
(Burger, 1980), when the Court extended patent protection to a genetically 
engineered microorganism. What was established in the US courts was 
subsequently extended globally via TRIPS when member countries were 
specifically prohibited from excluding microorganisms from patent 
protection (a prohibition extending to the draft language of the TPP). 
Chakrabarty’s case was among the first to distinguish between a living 
organism as found in nature and one created in the lab. The issue of 
laboratory creation versus natural discovery emerged again in the recent and 
highly publicized 2013 Myriad Genetics case heard by the United States 
Supreme Court. In Myriad, the Court determined that naturally occurring 
DNA could not be patented, but that cDNA, or complementary DNA, which 
is the product of laboratory work, could be (Barraclough, 2013) because 
cDNA was an invention (Leong, 2015, p. 677). Moreover, the extension of 
patents over DNA more generally (in the form of a patent thicket) allows a 
patent owner control at the level of the basic genetic marker. This means any 
use of the gene variant that predicts disease becomes the property of the 
patent holder, ‘extending’ property claims deep into biology and limiting 
scope for accessible treatment and future research. 
Access to affordable medicine is also derailed by efforts to patent 
medicine and distribute it solely as patented drugs. The failed Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) sought to abolish the legal 
distinction between counterfeit and generic drugs, a move supported by ‘big 
pharma’ in efforts to eliminate competition from generics and make access 
to medicine possible only under the terms of strong patent protection (Darch, 
2015b, p. 639). TPP and TTIP press forward with a generics prohibiting 
agenda. In reality, patents create the monopoly rents that incentivize 
counterfeiters; generic medicines, meanwhile, in reducing prices, eliminate 
scope for profiteering by patent holders and counterfeiters alike. Generics do 
not undermine creative incentives. Most innovative drugs research is 
government/charity/university funded (Boldrin and Levine, 2008). The 
predominant commercial contribution is in clinical and post-clinical trials. 
Costing between two and four times the price of publicly funded trials, this 
‘contribution’ allows patents, increases conflicts of interest, but serves no 
wider interest (Light and Warburton, 2005). Knowledge sharing, what 
Robert Merton (1973) called ‘academic communism’ is an essential 
foundation of science. In summary, generic medicines and public science 
maximize innovation, access and quality.  
Yet another deeply problematic issue in the global expansion of 
patents is technology transfer. WIPO has considered regulatory frameworks 
to facilitate technology transfer an essential part of its mission virtually from 
its inception.  WIPO continues to play a prominent role in acknowledging 
the importance of technology transfer with the 2007 Development Agenda.  
However, as an agency dedicated to IP, WIPO’s primary contribution is to 
create methods of licensing technology in the hope that such licenses will 
create the conditions for technology transfer.  However, at the same time, 
basic access to knowledge through access to textbooks is frowned upon as a 
copyright violation. Because there are myriad factors involved in technology 
transfer besides IP it is a complicated area of analysis.  However, a 
heightened fixation on the IP aspects of technology transfer can hinder the 
flow of ideas between states, especially transfers from the developed to the 
developing world. Agricultural research, for example, has shifted from being 
a primarily public sector activity to being a commercialized and private 
sector one David, 2005), thus enhancing the importance of IP in any 
technology transfer but also increasing the burden on the developing world 
to adhere to international IP norms. Matthew Rimmer’s work on patents and 
environmental technologies shows patents are not a panacea for global 
development. In fact, the patent system, in limiting access to green 
innovations, compounds our modern ecological crisis (Rimmer, 2011).  
Patenting seeds is another area where the global expansion of patents 
has undermined the public good. While TRIPS allows a country to exclude 
plant varieties from patent protection, a country can only do so if they have a 
viable sui generis form of protection in place. TPP and TTIP, alongside the 
41 US led ‘TRIPS plus’ bilateral treaties noted above, seek to close these 
flexibilities within TRIPS. Such attention to commercial ownership stands in 
opposition to agricultural history where farmers saved and shared seeds. The 
innovative overreach made possible by patents is the legal ability to continue 
to own seed after its sale. Today’s seeds come with restrictive licensing 
agreements - giving ongoing and continued control over seed to major agro-
businesses, also suggesting that technology transfer comes at a steep price 
for the global south. Farmers throughout the global south have resisted these 
seed practices but the law remains stacked against the farmer and is not a 
fair or open system of production or distribution of knowledge 
(Oguamanam, 2015). Developing countries have sought to limit Western 
patent extension by documenting traditional knowledge as ‘prior art’ 
(Thomas, 2015). However, the US (despite championing harmonisation) 
does not recognise unregistered, and sometimes even formally registered, 
‘prior art’ practiced outside its territory (Halbert, 2005, pp. 146-148).  
The uneasy relationship between traditional knowledge and patentable 
subject matter is another facet of alienation produced by the patent system. 
WIPO has linked indigenous and traditional knowledge within the global 
framing of intellectual property protection for almost two decades. 
Examining the efforts to share benefits with the San people for their 
knowledge of the properties of the Hoodia plant highlights some of the 
problems associated with using traditional knowledge in patent applications. 
The San people(s) of Southern Africa have known about and used the 
Hoodia plant as an appetite suppressant for centuries (Darch, 2015a, p. 265). 
After the plant was commercialized and claims of biopiracy were made, 
there was an attempt to develop a benefits-sharing system. However, ‘San’ 
communities are dispersed across six African states, and non-‘San’ 
communities in these areas also claim Hoodia use as part of their ‘traditional 
knowledge’ (Dutfield, 2015, pp. 652-653). The benefits sharing created 
disputes over ‘San’ identity that must be worked through, since there is no 
single voice or authority to speak for and act on behalf of ‘their’ claim 
(Coombe et al., 2015). Using the patent system to protect innovations 
emerging from traditional knowledge has not proven helpful in formalising 
the complex and historically rooted indigenous knowledge systems from 
where the original innovation emerged. Controversies over the exploitation 
of a local indigenous community for the commercial market have been, in 
this case, accentuated rather than resolved. Poorer farmers, traditional or not, 
loose more than they gain by the patent system.  
We now live in a world where access to food, medicine, clean 
drinking water, and much more are regulated by patents. While patents last 
for a limited time, patent thickets mean a product’s entry into the public 
domain may not be that simple - or even guaranteed. Indeed, rights holders 
increasingly wrap products and processes in layers of IP (from patents, to 
trademarks, to copyrights), and, increasingly, do not sell products to users 
but rather license them for specific uses. Further extension of IP will only 
compound existing problems.  
Trademark and Geographical Indicators 
While trademarks existed as early as the 16th century (Stolte, 1998, 
pp. 507–508), they became significant only after the industrial revolution 
and the growth of national markets and mass-produced branded products 
(Merges, 2000, pp. 2206-2207). Trademarks have expanded over time, and 
also now encompass the colours, sounds and phrases associated with a 
specific product or company. In some cases, trademark identification has 
become more important than the underlying product (Klein, 2009).  
Trademarks and geographical indications have no time limitation (subject to 
ongoing registration), thus preserving the past rather than incentivizing 
innovation. Global harmonisation and extension has then primarily widened 
geographical reach and depth of protection, not trademark’s duration in time.  
Global network capitalism increases the market size for trademarked 
(‘branded’) goods even as global supply networks (Chon, 2015) radically 
reduce, by means of outsourcing, the cost of producing ‘branded’ things. 
Moreover, such outsourcing sees physical production and physical product 
being increasingly detached from the symbolic valuation of goods. Increased 
market size combined with cost cutting, then, increases the value of 
trademarked brands so long as the mark can be controlled. Outsourcing 
combined with increasingly widely distributed global supply networks, 
however, also makes counterfeiting easier. Counterfeiters often use the same 
outsourced factories and distributed supply networks as mark holders; 
meaning the lawful and unlawful product only differ in who is selling it. 
This is almost by definition true for outsourced fashion goods. In the case of 
medicine and mechanical parts – where patents covers the substantive 
content – counterfeiting may well involve deception. For ‘empty signifiers’, 
however, where the sign is everything and substance was outsourced 
anyway, the counterfeit and the legitimate copy reveal/deceive in equal 
measure.  
Trademarks do not protect the consumer from deception. As Chon 
notes (2015), trademark protects mark holders from ‘tarnishment’ if another 
company trades goods using the first company’s mark. Trademark does not 
protect the customer from the lawful rights holder trading goods made by 
others as ‘its own’. Through global outsourcing, that is exactly what 
trademark holders do. Trademarks thus actually facilitate a kind of ‘auto-
tarnishment’. Significantly, the use of marks and brands in the creation of 
‘social imaginaries’ around symbols that are themselves then associated with 
mass-produced (and outsourced) commodities is central to today’s 
‘cognitive capitalism’ (Chon, 2015). Cognitive capitalism’s manufacture of 
such imaginaries, using marks and brands, is central to distancing products 
from the conditions of their production, and illustrative of the commodity 
fetishism that embeds symbolic meaning in things in direct counter-
distinction from their substantive reality (in content and creation). Chon 
(2015) argues that forms of ‘brand citizenship’ can ‘shine a light’ upon the 
hidden victims of today’s global supply networks - networks in which 
trademarks act as core bridges for TNCs to control profits from things they 
do not physically make or distribute, whilst at the same time being core to 
consumer ‘seduction’ regarding what it is they are buying. Brand 
citizenship, then, seeks to play cognitive capitalism’s social imaginaries 
against themselves, seeking to make TNCs live up to the illusions they seek 
to create. Counterfeit capitalism, meanwhile, seeks to play cognitive 
capitalism’s game in quite a different fashion. 
If trademarks are central to maintaining an imaginary relationship 
between signs and things, the counterfeit capitalism of those who hijack 
marks and brands to sell copies mimics both the product and the practice of 
that which it seeks to parasitize. The consumer of such goods is no more or 
less ‘deceived’ in buying such counterfeit couture than if they were buying 
‘the real thing’. Chris Rojek (2015) suggests ‘counterfeit culture’ trades 
symbolic fictions culturally just as ‘counterfeit capitalists’ and legitimate 
rights holders trade economically in such ‘social imaginaries’. Where 
counterfeit drugs and other technical goods can kill, fake fashion, for 
example, just plays cognitive capitalism’s social imaginary at its own game, 
if at a price more people can afford. Ultimately, just as patent monopolies 
inflate the price of medicines and hence create the market for counterfeit 
drugs (something that generic drugs deflate and hence protect citizens from), 
so trademarks create levels of monopoly rent that create the very incentives 
to (infringing) market entry that are manifested in piracy and counterfeiting. 
Having outsourced substantial ‘aura’ and ‘verisimilitude’ in things for 
globally pervasive, detachable and recognizable signs of ‘authorization’, this 
at first profitable strategy of trademarking now removes both the ability to 
control such signs and the grounds for claiming doing so would in any way 
benefit consumers. As such, contemporary efforts to secure trademark 
extension in depth and geographical reach do not serve the public interest. 
Geographical indications (GIs) have arisen since the TRIPS 
agreement, as a means of extending protection akin to that of trademark over 
goods with particular geographical associations. (Related rights over place 
names already existed in the case of such location-specific consumables as 
European wines and cheeses.) Advocates hoped GIs would empower local 
communities otherwise marginalized by global network capitalism’s 
deregulation of labour and raw materials markets. However, this has not 
proven to be the case. Rosemary Coombe et al. (2015) and Colin Darch 
(2015a) highlight how the GI for Rooibos tea reinforced the power of large 
scale, white farmers and processing factory owners over non-white farm 
labourers and small holders. Anita Chan (2014) demonstrates similar 
processes playing out in Peru. Daniel Gade (2004) details how precursors to 
GIs in France enabled the exclusion of migrant farmers even over many 
generations. In fostering the image of a harmonious ‘locale’ when seeking to 
sell a product as authentically local, the ‘social imaginaries’ manufactured 
around GIs - just like the branding tied to trademarks - obscure inequalities 
that need to be addressed if benefits of protection are to reach the most 
marginalized and exploited members of the supply network.  
The extension of trademark coverage in geographical scope and depth 
of coverage, in extending protection and profitability to rights holders over 
established cultural symbols, neither protects consumers, nor encourages 
innovation. Extending the logic of trademarks to traditional and local 
knowledge in the form of ‘Geographical Indications’ (in parallel also with 
attempts to extend patent principles to cover traditional knowledge and 
farmers rights) similarly only reinforces dominant interests, not the common 
good.  
Conclusions 
The policy implications of our analysis rest upon our demonstration of 
deep flaws in the assumptions underpinning the argument for global IP 
harmonisation and extension. These flaws are summarised in Table 1. [Insert 
Table 1 near here] Global network capitalism reduces costs for informational 
content and increases sales, as long as control over content is maintained. As 
such, global network capitalism incentivizes demand for IP extension. If 
control over content is maintained, it also affords the revenues necessary to 
lobby for such extension. However, IP holders’ need for such extension 
reflects their increased vulnerability in a global networked free market, 
where IP-infringing reproductions are now easier to produce - and are 
produced and circulated more widely than ever before, with much capacity 
to do so now lying in the hands of every networked computer user on the 
planet. To achieve control, then, it is now necessary to monitor and regulate 
the behaviour of everyone, everywhere, all the time. This requires a radical 
escalation of surveillance and policing, infringing a range of other rights: to 
privacy, fair use, free speech and access to information. Doing so only 
protects particular private interests, not the wider social interest. Our first 
policy recommendation is thus to reverse the trend towards criminalizing 
acts labelled as ‘piracy.’ Non-commercial IP infringement should not be 
subject to the types of surveillance now being structured to control it.  In an 
effort to de-escalate the enhanced surveillance that corresponds to more 
restrictive applications of IP rights, the trend should be towards 
decriminalization. 
Extension in time and geographical reach does not create additional 
incentives, only increasing the profitability of things already produced - a 
benefit to rights holders at the expense of a greater cost burden upon the 
wider society. There is no additional benefit to the wider society, but 
extension does increase the scope of protection to choke off future 
innovation (such as was seen in the cases of orphan works, trolling and 
thickets). Thus, our second policy recommendation is that the length of time 
in which IP rights are protected be reduced not expanded.  Additionally, and 
third, forcing all developing countries to enact strong IP rights before they 
are ready to do so should be halted. 
Extension in ‘depth of coverage’ (such as over living organisms, DNA 
and the ‘look and feel’ of certain expressions and designs) would allow new 
domains of ownership, and so perhaps increase incentives to create. 
However, extending control deeper into abstract ideas relative to particular 
expressions, in discoveries relative to inventions, and in carriers (such as 
seeds and ‘eBooks’) relative to their informational content, would require 
unprecedented levels of policing; it would also enable so great a control over 
subsequent innovations as to do more harm than good - both in terms of 
immediate infringement of other rights, and, in the longer term, choking off 
of innovation. And so our fourth policy recommendation is we do not offer 
further coverage of abstractions. 
Further extensions of IPRs are not warranted. That citizens have been 
excluded from the negotiating process has led to disquiet: firstly, because 
citizens are not being consulted; and secondly, because the implications of 
such extensions would ‘target’ citizens as both object of increased 
surveillance and of increased costs. Whilst deregulation is used to reduce 
protections and rights for most, regulation is promoted to increase protection 
for property holders. Those who do not benefit from such inconsistency vote 
increasingly with their feet – whether that means campaigning against 
extension, resisting existing protectionism, or in bypassing or ignoring IPRs 
altogether. The global networked world, as we have seen, makes this 
increasingly possible. 
 
 References 
Archibugi, D. and Filippetti, A. (2010) ‘The Globalisation of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Four Learned Lessons and Four Theses’, Global Policy, 1 
(2), pp. 137-49. DOI: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00019.x  
Barraclough, E. (2013) ‘What Myriad Means for Biotech’, WIPO Magazine 
[online]. August. Available from: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/04/article_0007.html 
[Accessed May 31, 2016]. 
Boldrin, M. and Levine, D. K. (2008) Against Intellectual Monopoly. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Brown, I. (2015) ‘Copyright Technologies and Clashing Rights’, in M. 
David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. 
London: Sage, pp. 567–85. 
Burger, W. E. (1980) ‘Diamond v. Chakrabarty - 447 U.S. 303 (1980)’, 
Justia US Supreme Court Center [online]. 16 June. Available from: 
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/303/case.html [Accessed May 
31, 2016]. 
Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Chan, A. (2014) The Promiscuity of Networks: Digital Universalism and 
Local Farmers in the Information-Age. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chon, M. (2015) ‘Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value Networks’, in 
M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. 
London: Sage, pp. 171–88. 
Coombe, R. J., Ives, S., and Huizenga, D. (2015) ‘The Social Imaginary of 
Geographical Indicators in Contested Environments: The Politicized 
Heritage and the Racialized Landscapes of South African Rooibos Tea’, in 
M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. 
London: Sage, pp. 224–37. 
Crouch, C. (2011) The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Darch, C. (2015a) ‘The Political Economy of Traditional Knowledge, 
Trademarks and Copyright in South Africa’, in M. David and D. Halbert 
(eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 263–78. 
Darch, C. (2015b) ‘Politics, Law and Discourse: Patents and Innovation in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa’, in M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage 
Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 631–48.  
David, M. (1996) ‘Information: Culture or Capital?’, Radical Philosophy, 79 
(Sep/Oct), p. 56.  
David, M. (2005) Science in Society. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
David, M. (2006) ‘Romanticism, Creativity and Copyright: Visions and 
Nightmares’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9 (3), pp. 425–33. DOI: 
10.1177/1368431006066566. 
David, M. (2010) Peer to Peer and the Music Industry: The Criminalization 
of Sharing. London: Sage. 
David, M. and Halbert, D. (2015) Owning the World of Ideas: Intellectual 
Property and Global Network Capitalism. London: Sage 
David, M., Kirton, A., and Millward, P. (2015) ‘Sports Television 
Broadcasting and the Challenge of Live-Streaming’, in M. David and D. 
Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 
435–50. 
Duffy, J. F. (2002) ‘Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law’, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, 17, pp. 685–726. DOI: 10.15779/Z386Q39 
Dutfield, G. (2015) ‘Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property and 
Pharmaceutical Innovation: What’s Left to Discuss?’, in M. David and D. 
Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 
649–64. 
Gade, D. (2004) ‘Tradition, Territory, and Terroir in French Viniculture: 
Cassis, France, and Appellation Contrôlée’, Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 94 (4), pp. 848–67. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
8306.2004.00438.x. 
Gervais, D. (2015) ‘TRIPS and Development’, in M. David and D. Halbert 
(eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 95–112.  
Ghosh, S. (2015) ‘The Idea of International Intellectual Property’, in M. 
David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. 
London: Sage, pp. 52–70.  
Halbert, D. (2005) Resisting Intellectual Property. New York: Routledge. 
Halbert, D. (2007) ‘The World Intellectual Property Organization: Past, 
Present and Future’, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., 54 (2): 
pp. 253–84.  
Held, D. (2010) Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Cambridge: Polity. 
Henry, C. and Stiglitz, J. (2010) ‘Intellectual Property, Dissemination of 
Innovation and Sustainable Development’, Global Policy, 1 (3), pp. 237-51. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00048.x  
Johns, A. (2009) Piracy: From Guttenberg to Gates. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.  
Klein, N. (2009) No Logo. New York, NY: Picador. 
Krueger, A. B. (2004) ‘The economics of real superstars: the market for rock 
concerts in the material world.’ Journal of Labor Economics [online]. 23 (1), 
pp. 1–30. Available from: 
http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp016108vb25k/1/484
.pdf [Accessed May 31, 2016]. 
Lee, J-A. (2015) ‘Non-profits in the Commons Economy’, in M. David and 
D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 
335–54. 
Leong, S.H.S. (2015) ‘Patentable Subject Matter: A Comparative 
Jurisdictional Analysis of the Discovery/Invention Dichotomy’, in M. David 
and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, 
pp. 665–84.  
Levine, D. S. (2012) ‘Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the 
Creation of International Intellectual Property Law’, Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Review, 30, pp. 105–51.  
Liebler, R. (2015) ‘Copyright and Ownership of Fan Created Works: Fanfiction 
and Beyond’, in M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual 
Property. London: Sage, pp. 391–403.  
Light, D. and Warburton, R. (2005) ‘Extraordinary Claims Require 
Extraordinary Evidence’, Journal of Health Economics, 24, pp. 1030-33. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.07.001. 
May, C. (2007a) The World Intellectual Property Organisation: Resurgence 
and the Development Agenda. London: Routledge.  
May, C. (2007b) Digital Rights Management: The Problem of Expanding 
Ownership Rights. Oxford: Chandos.  
May, C. and Sell, S. (2005) Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Merges, R. P. (2000) ‘Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century: One 
Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000’, 
California Law Review, 88 (December), pp. 2187–240.  
Merton, R. (1973) The Sociology of Science. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Moberg, K. (2014) ‘Private Industry’s Impact on U.S. Trade Law and 
International Intellectual Property Law: A Study of Post-TRIPS U.S. 
Bilateral Agreements and the Capture of the USTR’, Journal of the Patent 
and Trademark Office Society, 96 (2), pp. 228–56.  
O’Brien, D. (2015) ‘Creativity and Copyright: The International Career of a 
New Economy’, in M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of 
Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 315–30. 
Ochoa, T. T., and Rose, M. (2002) ‘Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent 
and Copyright Clause’, Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 
84 (12), pp. 909–40.  
Oguamanam, C. (2015) ‘Farmers’ Rights and the Intellectual Property 
Dynamic in Agriculture’, in M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook 
of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 238–57.  
Op den Kamp, C. (2015) ‘Copyright and Film Historiography: The Case of 
the Orphan Film’, in M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of 
Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 404–17. 
Patel, R. (2015) ‘A Public Health Imperative: The Need for Meaningful 
Change in the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Intellectual Property Chapter’, 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 16 (1), pp. 477–507. 
 
Patry, W. (2009) Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Phythian-Adams, S. L. (2015) ‘“The Economic Foundations of Intellectual 
Property”: An Arts and Cultural Economist’s Perspective’, in M. David and 
D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 
28–51. 
Rimmer, M. (2011) Intellectual Property and Climate Change: Inventing 
Clean Technologies. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Rojek, C. (2015) ‘Counterfeit Commerce: The Illegal Accumulation and 
Distribution of Intellectual Property’, in M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage 
Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 189–206. 
Ryan, M. (1998) Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the 
Politics of Intellectual Property. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press.  
Stolte, K. M. (1998) ‘How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law 
Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s Conundrum’, Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 8 (2), pp. 505–46.  
Sell, S. (2003) Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual 
Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Thomas, P. (2015) ‘Copyright and Copyleft in India: Between Global 
Agencies and Local Interests’, in M. David and D. Halbert (eds), Sage 
Handbook of Intellectual Property. London: Sage, pp. 355-69. 
Yu, P. (2015) ‘Deja Vu in the International Intellectual Property Regime’, in 
M. David and D. Halbert (eds) Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property. 
London: Sage, pp. 113–29.  
  
Table 1: The Consequences of IP Expansion  
 
IP Expansion in 
Time, Depth 
and/or Reach 
Disincentive Consumer 
Harm 
Producer Harm 
Copyright Extends 
Uncertainty; 
Defends 
Increasingly 
Old Ideas; 
Inhibits Novel 
Uses 
Escalates 
Prices; 
Reduces 
Access 
Increases Opportunity 
Costs; 
Increases Insecure 
Non-Employment 
 
Patent Increases 
Thickets; 
Encourages 
Trolls; 
Reduces 
Collaboration 
Increases 
Prices; 
Reduces 
Access; 
Encourages 
Counterfeits 
Failure to Reward 
Traditional Producers; 
Increases Exploitation 
and/or Exclusion of 
Traditional Producers, 
Farmers etc.  
Trademark/GIs Perpetual 
Reward for Old 
over the New  
Auto-
Tarnishment; 
Encouraging 
Outsourcing, 
Reducing 
Quality and 
Transparency 
Increasing Outsourcing 
Reduces Worker 
Conditions; 
Failure to Improve 
Conditions for 
Traditional and/or 
Primary Producers 
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